Abstract

There are two parts to the dissertation. The first part contains arguments for the following theses: there are two distinct forms of idealism in the western philosophical tradition, the distinction between the two forms of idealism rests on whether or not the existence of extramental material bodies is acknowledged, and the standard definitions of idealism fail to capture this distinction between the two forms of idealism. ;The second part applies the distinction between the two forms of idealism to a particular case. The philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena has been described by some commentators as a version of idealism that anticipates the idealism of Berkeley and Hegel. On this interpretation, Eriugena is credited with producing a version of idealism that is unique among pre-modern thinkers in reducing reality to the contents of mind. I argue that this interpretation is mistaken. I contend that Eriugena and Berkeley present distinct types of idealism. Whereas Eriugena acknowledges the existence of extramental material bodies, Berkeley denies the existence of extramental material bodies. Concerning the reputed similarity between Eriugena and Hegel, I argue that if there is a similarity, it results from Hegel's return to a quasi-Neoplatonic ontology which acknowledges the existence of extramental material bodies rather' than Eriugena's anticipation of uniquely modern forms of idealism which reduce reality to the contents of mind.