What Makes Normative Concepts Normative

Southwest Philosophy Review 37 (1) (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

When asked which of our concepts are normative concepts, metaethicists would be quick to list such concepts as GOOD, OUGHT, and REASON. When asked why such concepts belong on the list, metaethicists would be much slower to respond. Matti Eklund is a notable exception. In his recent book, Choosing Normative Concepts, Eklund argues by elimination for “the Normative Role view” that normative concepts are normative in virtue of having a “normative role” or being “used normatively”. One view that Eklund aims to eliminate is “the Metaphysical view” that normative concepts are normative in virtue of referring to normative properties. In addition to arguing that Eklund’s objection looks doubtful by its own lights, we argue that there are several plausible versions of the Metaphysical view that Eklund doesn’t eliminate, defending various claims about normative concepts and their relationships to deliberation, competence, reference, and possession along the way.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Against Schmought.Matthew Vermaire - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (9):465-485.
Normative roles, conceptual variance, and ardent realism about normativity.David Plunkett - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (5):509-534.
Choosing normative properties: a reply to Eklund’s Choosing Normative Concepts.Stephanie Leary - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (5):455-474.
Normative roles, conceptual variance, and ardent realism about normativity.David Plunkett - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (5):509-534.
Quasi-Naturalism and the Problem of Alternative Normative Concepts.Camil Golub - 2022 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (5):474-500.
Choosing Normative Concepts.Matthew S. Bedke - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):121-126.
Choosing Normative Concepts, written by Matti Eklund. [REVIEW]Nicholas Drake - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (4):441-444.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-12-10

Downloads
854 (#1,396)

6 months
188 (#105,928)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Shawn Xavier Hernandez
University of Pennsylvania
N. G. Laskowski
University of Maryland, College Park

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.David Enoch - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Choosing Normative Concepts.Matti Eklund - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Afterthoughts.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 565-614.
The Importance of Concepts.Sarah Sawyer - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):127-147.

View all 13 references / Add more references