Witnessing from Here: Self-Awareness from a Bodily versus Embodied Perspective

In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press (2011)
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Abstract

This article argues against the no-self or nonegological account of bodily self-awareness. It proposes an account of consciousness that challenges Miri Albahari's forceful defence of a nonegological view of consciousness, particularly its sharp distinction between subject and self. It contends that the subject of experience is a bodily subject and not merely an embodied one and argues that in order to be a subject of experience even in the minimal sense of witnessing-from-a-perspective, one must be prereflectively aware of oneself as a living body. It also argues in defence of the necessary presence of a minimal bodily sense of self as a constitutive feature of perspectival awareness of the world.

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Evan Thompson
University of British Columbia
Aaron Henry
University of British Columbia

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