Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):246-258 (2015)

Authors
Naomi Kloosterboer
VU University Amsterdam
Abstract
I critically analyze Richard Moran's account of knowing one's own emotions, which depends on the Transparency Claim for self-knowledge. Applied to knowing one's own beliefs, TC states that when one is asked “Do you believe P?”, one can answer by referencing reasons for believing P. TC works for belief because one is justified in believing that one believes P if one can give reasons for why P is true. Emotions, however, are also conceptually related to concerns; they involve a response to something one cares about. As a consequence, acquiring self-knowledge of one's emotions requires knowledge of other mental attitudes, which falls outside the scope of TC. Hence, TC cannot be applied to emotions
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1080/13869795.2015.1032327
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,078
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.

View all 28 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

How Do You Know That You Settled a Question?Tillmann Vierkant - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):199-211.
The Value of Transparent Self-Knowledge.Fleur Jongepier - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):65-86.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Two Objections to Moran’s Transparency Account.Julie Germein - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):735-740.
Epistemology and Emotions.Georg Brun, Ulvi Dogluoglu & Dominique Kuenzle (eds.) - 2008 - Ashgate Publishing Company.
First Person Authority and Knowledge of One's Own Actions.Martin F. Fricke - 2013 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 45 (134):3-16.
Intentionality and Compound Accounts of the Emotions.Reid D. Blackman - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):67-90.
Meta-Emotions.Christoph Jäger & Anne Bartsch - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):179-204.
Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
Emotions and Argumentation.Aaron Ben-Ze'ev - 1995 - Informal Logic 17 (2).
Emotions: An Aristotelian Solution.Maria Magoula Adamos - 2000 - Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara
A New Role for Emotions in Epistemology?Georg Brun & Dominique Kuenzle - 2008 - In Georg Brun, Ulvi Dogluoglu & Dominique Kuenzle (eds.), Epistemology and Emotions. Ashgate Publishing Company. pp. 1--31.
Les Mauvaises Émotions.Christine Tappolet - 2011 - In Fabrice Teroni, Christine Tappolet & Anita Konzelman Ziv (eds.), Les Ombres de l'âme. Penser les émotions négatives. pp. 37-51.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-06-12

Total views
39 ( #288,879 of 2,498,850 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #279,629 of 2,498,850 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes