Abstract

The so-called Buddhist momentarists, such as Dharmakīrti and his followers, defend the momentariness of all things. However, with equal force they also defend the persistence of all things, not just within a single lifetime but over an indefinite cycle of rebirth. Naturally, they have an interesting theory of persistence, according to which things persist without being self-identical over time. The theory is best presented in the Lokāyatāparīkṣā chapter of Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha and Kamalaśīla’s Paṅjikā, as they clearly articulate the criteria of persistence without identity. The purpose of this paper is to formulate a Buddhist theory of persistence through the analysis of these texts. Here is the basic formula: Things persist as series, which is constituted by momentary entities that are causally related as upādāna and upādeya. Upādāna causal relation is demarcated from other causal relations by the principle of changeability with temporal restriction, and the principle adopts further qualifications to accommodate complex cases and personal persistence. I have addressed a problem that contemporary physicalism might pose a threat to the Buddhist account of personal persistence, and argued that the problem can be evaded by regarding persons as psycho-physical entities rather than strictly non-physical. In its general outlook, the Buddhist theory of persistence is close to Theodore Sider’s stage theory in that persistence is a matter of distinct individuals standing in a special causal relationship. As regards personal persistence, the Buddhist has a stricter condition than Parfit’s IDM thesis, which states that psychological connectedness with any cause is what matters for survival. The Buddhist would say it is moral connectedness with a special cause called upādāna.