Subjective total comparative evaluations

Economics and Philosophy 40 (1):212-225 (2024)
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Abstract

In Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare, I argued, among other things, that preferences in economics are and ought to be total subjective comparative evaluations, that the theory of rational choice is a reformulation of everyday folk-psychological explanations and predictions of behaviour, and that revealed preference theory is completely untenable. All three of these theses have been challenged in essays by Erik Angner (2018), Francesco Guala (2019) and Johanna Thoma (2021a, 2021b). This essay responds to these criticisms and defends these three theses.

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Daniel Hausman
University of Wisconsin, Madison

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References found in this work

In Defence of Revealed Preference Theory.Johanna Thoma - 2021 - Economics and Philosophy 37 (2):163-187.
Preferences: neither behavioural nor mental.Francesco Guala - 2019 - Economics and Philosophy 35 (3):383-401.
What Preferences Really Are.Erik Angner - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (4):660-681.
Foundations of Economic Analysis.Paul Anthony Samuelson - 1948 - Science and Society 13 (1):93-95.

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