In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence (forthcoming)

Authors
Ali Hasan
University of Iowa
Abstract
It is commonly thought that we depend fundamentally on the “evidence of the senses” for our empicial beliefs, including and most directly, our beliefs about our local environment, the spatial world around us. The ultimate evidence we have for our perceptual beliefs is provided in some way by perception or perceptual experience. But what is this evidence? There seem to be three main options: external factualism allows that the evidence include facts about the external world; internal factualism takes facts that involve only the internal, mental world—like facts about one’s perceptual experiences or appearances—to count as one’s perceptual evidence; and non-factualism takes propositions, including false ones, to count as evidence—for example, propositional contents of appearances or seemings. We shall see that all these options face significant challenges. Some might conclude that perceptual beliefs can be justified without depending on evidence. Others might choose to accept skepticism: our perceptual beliefs are not justified. I shall end, however, by tentatively suggesting that there is a sort of internal fact that is a plausible candidate for perceptual evidence that has been overlooked.
Keywords perceptual evidence  evidence  Evidentialism  perception
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
Science, Perception and Reality.Wilfrid Sellars (ed.) - 1963 - New York: Humanities Press.
What is Justified Belief?Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer (ed.) - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

View all 37 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Perceptual Consciousness Plays No Epistemic Role.Jacob Berger - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):7-23.
Multisensory Evidence.Casey O'Callaghan - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):238-256.
Perception and Evidence.Alex Byrne - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170:101-113.
The Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Learning.Elijah Chudnoff - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):520-542.
Introduction: Perceptual Evidence.James Genone - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):873-873.
The Evidence of the Senses is No Evidence From the Senses.Tommaso Piazza - 2013 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 16 (1):174-191.
Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence.Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
Weak Non-Evidentialism.Tommaso Piazza - forthcoming - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Luca Moretti (eds.), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Brill.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2022-06-20

Total views
128 ( #92,553 of 2,519,870 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
128 ( #5,099 of 2,519,870 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes