Authors
David James Barnett
University of Toronto, St. George Campus
Abstract
According to a traditional Cartesian epistemology of perception, perception does not provide one with direct knowledge of the external world. Instead, your immediate perceptual evidence is limited to facts about your own visual experience, from which conclusions about the external world must be inferred. Cartesianism faces well-known skeptical challenges. But this chapter argues that any anti-Cartesian view strong enough to avoid these challenges must license a way of updating one’s beliefs in response to anticipated experiences that seems diachronically irrational. To avoid this result, the anti-Cartesian must either license an unacceptable epistemic chauvinism, or else claim that merely reflecting on one’s experiences defeats perceptual justification. This leaves us with a puzzle: Although Cartesianism faces problems, avoiding them brings a new set of problems.
Keywords perception, justification, perceptual justification, perceptual knowledge, evidence, rationality, skepticism, internalism, dogmatism
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DOI 10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0001
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Home University Library.

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Citations of this work BETA

Evidence of Evidence as Higher Order Evidence.Anna-Maria A. Eder & Peter Brössel - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 62-83.
Perceiving as Knowing in the Predictive Mind.Daniel Munro - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1177-1203.

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