Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6 (2019)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
According to a traditional Cartesian epistemology of perception, perception does not provide one with direct knowledge of the external world. Instead, your immediate perceptual evidence is limited to facts about your own visual experience, from which conclusions about the external world must be inferred. Cartesianism faces well-known skeptical challenges. But this chapter argues that any anti-Cartesian view strong enough to avoid these challenges must license a way of updating one’s beliefs in response to anticipated experiences that seems diachronically irrational. To avoid this result, the anti-Cartesian must either license an unacceptable epistemic chauvinism, or else claim that merely reflecting on one’s experiences defeats perceptual justification. This leaves us with a puzzle: Although Cartesianism faces problems, avoiding them brings a new set of problems.
|
Keywords | perception, justification, perceptual justification, perceptual knowledge, evidence, rationality, skepticism, internalism, dogmatism |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
ISBN(s) | |
DOI | 10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0001 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
View all 63 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Evidence of Evidence as Higher Order Evidence.Anna-Maria A. Eder & Peter Brössel - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 62-83.
Perceiving as Knowing in the Predictive Mind.Daniel Munro - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1177-1203.
Similar books and articles
Phenomenalist Dogmatist Experientialism and the Distinctiveness Problem.Harmen8 Ghijsen - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1549-1566.
¿Qué está mal con el dogmatismo de Pryor?Jorge Ornelas Bernal & G. Cíntora - 2014 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 26 (1):7-31.
Epistemic Internalism and Perceptual Content: How a Fear of Demons Leads to an Error Theory of Perception.Robert J. Howell - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2153-2170.
How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism.Paul Silva - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):501-514.
Skepticism and the Liberal/Conservative Conceptions of Perceptual Justification.Hamid Vahid - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):45-61.
The Epistemic Unity of Perception.Elijah Chudnoff & David Didomenico - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):535-549.
Consciousness and its Transcendental Conditions: Kant’s Anti-Cartesian Revolt.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2007 - In Lähteenmäki & Remes Heinämaa (ed.), Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy. Springer.
Schellenberg on the Epistemic Force of Experience.Matthew McGrath - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):897-905.
Liberalism and Conservatism in the Epistemology of Perceptual Belief.Ram Neta - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):685-705.
Foundational Beliefs and the Structure of Justification.Kenneth Hobson - 2008 - Synthese 164 (1):117 - 139.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2016-02-09
Total views
519 ( #16,679 of 2,499,692 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
74 ( #10,410 of 2,499,692 )
2016-02-09
Total views
519 ( #16,679 of 2,499,692 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
74 ( #10,410 of 2,499,692 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads