Law and Philosophy 22 (s 3-4):247-276 (2003)

This paper investigates the accusation that judicial review is undemocratic. It argues that the alleged tension between judicial review and democracy fails to account for the fact that the content of rights and their scope depends on societal convictions and moral judgments of the public. Such dependence suggests that rights-based judicial review can be described as an alternative form of democratic participation
Keywords Law   Logic   Philosophy of Law   Law Theory/Law Philosophy   Political Science   Social Issues
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1024505219735
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References found in this work BETA

The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Philosophy 63 (243):119-122.
Reminder.[author unknown] - 1973 - The Owl of Minerva 5 (2):1-1.

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Is Judicial Review Democratic? A Comment on Harel.Larry Alexander - 2003 - Law and Philosophy 22 (s 3-4):277-283.

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