Synthese 147 (1):21-41 (
2005)
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Abstract
It is known that Hume’s Principle, adjoined to a suitable formulation of second-order logic, gives a theory which is almost certainly consistent4 and suffices for arithmetic in the sense that it yields the Dedekind-Peano axioms as theorems. While Hume’s Principle cannot be taken as a definition in any strict sense requiring that it provide for the eliminative paraphrase of its definiendum in every admissible type of occurrence, we hold that it can be viewed as an implicit definition of a sortal concept of cardinal number and, accordingly, as being analytic of that concept. This, coupled with the fact that Hume’s Principle so conceived requires a prior understanding only of (second-order) logical vocabulary, is enough to justify regarding the resulting account of the foundations of arithmetic as a form of logicism. Whether this claim can ultimately be sustained is of course still very much a matter of controversy. But here, rather than add to the debate on that issue, I should like to assume that it can be, and on that basis, address some further questions