Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (4):786-798 (2009)
AbstractDisquotational theories of truth, that is, theories of truth based on the T-sentences or similar equivalences as axioms are often thought to be deductively weak. This view is correct if the truth predicate is allowed to apply only to sentences not containing the truth predicate. By taking a slightly more liberal approach toward the paradoxes, I obtain a disquotational theory of truth that is proof theoretically as strong as compositional theories such as the Kripket probe the compositional axioms
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References found in this work
Truth, Vagueness, and Paradox: An Essay on the Logic of Truth.Vann McGee - 1990 - Indianapolis, IN, USA: Hackett.