The Modal—Amodal Distinction in the Debate on Conceptual Format

Philosophies 3 (2):7 (2018)
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Abstract

In this paper, I review the main criteria offered for distinguishing the modal and amodal approaches to conceptual format: the type of input to which the representations respond, the relation they bear to perceptual states, and the specific neural systems to which they belong. I evaluate different interpretations of them and argue that they all face difficulties. I further show that they lead to cross-classifications of certain types of representations, using approximate number representations as an example.

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2018-03-29

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Sabrina Haimovici
University of Buenos Aires

References found in this work

The Language of Thought.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - Critica 10 (28):140-143.
Perceptual symbol systems.Lawrence W. Barsalou - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):577-660.
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 2023 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 11.

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