Abstract

Occasional being was obtained in the analysis of the Aristotelian term "non-existent" (μὴ ὄν). In the article, the occasional is given wide ontological powers, allowing to interpret the being of Aristotle and a number of Kant's substantive concepts in the aspect of complex temporal configurations. An attempt is made to clarify how the occasional appears in Aristotle as a correlate of the existent, and in Kant as the unknowable X, which is opposed by the unity of transcendental knowledge. Kant's desire to "clear" the substantial from the occasional leads to such changes in the temporal mosaic, in which the actual empirical becomes shaky. At the same time, the only stable in the flickering of the empirical is the synthesis of the manifold, the concept of the soul and transcendental apperception. The article also presents an analysis of the concept of time.