The Identity That Doesn’t Deny Difference: A Non-dualist Argument

Journal of Indian Philosophy 49 (2):257-289 (2021)
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Abstract

Brahmānanda Sarasvatī has written an elaborate comment on the following inference cited in Advaitasiddhi: attribute etc. are identical to and different from attributee etc. since they are co-referential. There he wants to prove that every significant case of attribution is a case of identity that coexists with a difference between two demarcators. The identity that coexists with difference is called ‘equality’. This paper will argue that in each case of equality, the realist ontology chooses either identity over difference or the reverse. In the case of ‘the black pot’, the realist ontology prefers difference over identity. In the case of ‘the qualified object is the mere object’, the same ontology prefers identity over difference. Accordingly the ontological ‘entity’ gets projected. This is perhaps because the realist ontology is guided by Ockham’s razor and the grammatical classification of objects.

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Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay.Francis Herbert Bradley - 1893 - London, England: Oxford University Press.
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