Abstract

Tissue typing (TT) is a recent and controversial scientific advance. Whilst its current applications can easily be described as protherapeutic and within the realms of preventative medicine,1 its specificity and potential are often characterized as the tip of the eugenic iceberg: undermining the very basis of individual autonomy and identity in an inevitable march towards the perfect society:2 In addition to arguments concerning societal harms flowing from TT, significant concerns have also been raised concerning harms to the future child born as a result. In the context of current legislation and policy, this article examines two aspects of arguments concerning harm to the future child: those relating to psychological harms, and those arguing that TT is contrary to the future child’s best interests.3The article examines the moral basis for arguments concerning harm to the future child. It proposes that arguments concerning psychological harm may overlook or minimise the potential benefits flowing from the broader social, familial context into which the child is born. These arguments may be countered, or at least balanced, by considering the future child in this context. In relation to arguments that TT is contrary to the future child’s best interests, the paper examines a non-standard consideration of best interests. It argues that this standard should be used in considering whether or not TT for bone marrow transplant is harmful to the future child, thereby extending moral consideration of interests to intra-familial interests and outcomes. On this basis, it can be argued that TT is not contrary to the interests of the future child. The paper concludes by noting a potential tension between the first guiding principle of the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) and the current Victorian policy on TT.