Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (2007)

Abstract
G. E. Moore observed that to assert, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' would be 'absurd'. Over half a century later, such sayings continue to perplex philosophers. In the definitive treatment of the famous paradox, Green and Williams explain its history and relevance and present new essays by leading thinkers in the area
Keywords Self Knowledge   Moore’s Paradox
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy this book $50.00 used (60% off)   $118.00 new (6% off)   $125.00 from Amazon    Amazon page
Call number B1647.M74.M66 2007
ISBN(s) 9780199282791   019928279X
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,089
Through your library
Chapters BETA

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Judgment as a Guide to Belief.Nicholas Silins - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Believing Things Unknown.Aidan McGlynn - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):385-407.
Protest and Speech Act Theory.Matthew Chrisman & Graham Hubbs - 2021 - In Rachel Katharine Sterken & Justin Khoo (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language. New York: Routledge. pp. 179-192.
Moore's Paradox and Akratic Belief.Eugene Chislenko - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):669-690.

View all 40 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Moorean Pretense.Robert M. Gordon - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
Introduction.Mitchell Green & John N. Williams - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
Moore’s Paradoxes and Conscious Belief.John Nicholas Williams - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):383-414.
The Normative Character of Belief.Thomas Baldwin - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-07-31

Total views
148 ( #77,938 of 2,499,008 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #62,957 of 2,499,008 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes