Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.)
Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (2007)
Abstract |
G. E. Moore observed that to assert, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' would be 'absurd'. Over half a century later, such sayings continue to perplex philosophers. In the definitive treatment of the famous paradox, Green and Williams explain its history and relevance and present new essays by leading thinkers in the area
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Keywords | Self Knowledge Moore’s Paradox |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Buy this book | $118.00 new (6% off) $125.00 from Amazon Amazon page |
Call number | B1647.M74.M66 2007 |
ISBN(s) | 9780199282791 019928279X |
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What Reflexive Pronouns Tell Us About Belief : A New Moore's Paradox de Se, Rationality, and Privileged Access.Jay David Atlas
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Judgment as a Guide to Belief.Nicholas Silins - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Protest and Speech Act Theory.Matthew Chrisman & Graham Hubbs - 2021 - In Rachel Katharine Sterken & Justin Khoo (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language. New York: Routledge. pp. 179-192.
Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief.David James Barnett - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):184-212.
Moore's Paradox and Akratic Belief.Eugene Chislenko - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):669-690.
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