Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person

& (eds.)
Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (2007)
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Abstract

G. E. Moore observed that to assert, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' would be 'absurd'. Over half a century later, such sayings continue to perplex philosophers. In the definitive treatment of the famous paradox, Green and Williams explain its history and relevance and present new essays by leading thinkers in the area

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B1647.M74.M66 2007

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9780199282791   019928279X
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Chapters

Consciousness, reasons, and Moore's paradox.André Gallois
Introduction.Mitchell Green & John N. Williams
Moore's paradox and the transparency of belief.Jonathan E. Adler & Bradley Armour-Garb
Moore's paradox, Evans's principle, and iterated beliefs.John N. Williams
Moorean absurdity : an epistemological analysis.Claudio de Almeida
Moorean absurdity and showing what's within.Mitchell Green
Moorean pretense.Robert M. Gordon
My philosophical position says p and I don't believe p.Alan Hájek
The All-seeing Eye :A Blind Spot in the History of Ideas.Roy Sorensen
The normative character of belief.Thomas Baldwin
What reflexive pronouns tell us about belief : a new Moore's paradox de se, rationality, and privileged access.Jay David Atlas

Similar books and articles

Introduction to Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality and the First Person.John N. Williams & Mitchell S. Green - unknown
Review of Mitchell green, John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. [REVIEW]Stephen Hetherington - 2007 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (8).
My philosophical position says p and I don't believe p.Alan Hájek - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
Moore's paradox and the transparency of belief.Jonathan E. Adler & Bradley Armour-Garb - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
Consciousness, reasons, and Moore's paradox.André Gallois - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
Introduction.Mitchell Green & John N. Williams - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
Moore's paradox, Evans's principle, and iterated beliefs.John N. Williams - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
The normative character of belief.Thomas Baldwin - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
Moorean pretense.Robert M. Gordon - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
Moorean absurdity : an epistemological analysis.Claudio de Almeida - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.

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Author Profiles

Mitchell Green
University of Connecticut
John N. Williams
Singapore Management University

Citations of this work

Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.
Believing Things Unknown.Aidan McGlynn - 2011 - Noûs 47 (2):385-407.
Explaining enkratic asymmetries: knowledge-first style.Paul Silva - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2907-2930.
Judgment as a Guide to Belief.Nicholas Silins - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.

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