History and Philosophy of Logic 35 (3):272-288 (2014)

Dirk Greimann
Universidade Federal Fluminense
In a posthumous text written in 1915, Frege makes some puzzling remarks about the essence of logic, arguing that the essence of logic is indicated, properly speaking, not by the word ‘true’, but by the assertoric force. William Taschek has recently shown that these remarks, which have received only little attention, are very important for understanding Frege's conception of logic. On Taschek's reconstruction, Frege characterizes logic in terms of assertoric force in order to stress the normative role that the logical laws play vis-à-vis judgement, assertion and inference. My aim in this paper is to develop and defend an alternative reconstruction according to which Frege stresses that logic is not only concerned with ‘how thoughts follow from other thoughts’, but also with the ‘step from thought to truth-value’. Frege considers logic as a branch of the theory of justification. To justify a conclusion by means of a logical inference, the ‘step from thought to truth-value’ must be taken, that is, the premis..
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DOI 10.1080/01445340.2014.901656
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Über Sinn und Bedeutung.Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Philosophische Kritik 100 (1):25-50.
The Frege Reader.Gottlob Frege & Michael Beaney (eds.) - 1997 - Oxford, England: Blackwell.

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Frege’s Performative Argument Against Truth Relativism.Dirk Greimann - 2015 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 3 (2).

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