Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):125-148 (2007)

Dirk Greimann
Universidade Federal Fluminense
It is commonly assumed that the conception of truth defended by Frege in his mature period is characterized by the view that truth is not the property denoted by the predicate 'is true', but the object named by true sentences. In the present paper, I wish to make plausible an alternative interpretation according to which Frege's conception is characterized by the view that truth is what is expressed in natural language by the "form of the assertoric sentence". So construed, truth is neither an object (like the True) nor a property (like the Bedeutung of the predicate 'is true') but something of a very special kind that belongs to the same logical category as the logical relations (like subsumption). The main argument justifying this interpretation is that Frege's explication of truth does not hold of the True, but only of truth, considered as what is expressed by the form of the assertoric sentence.
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DOI 10.1163/9789401204026_006
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Does Frege Have a Metalinguistic Truth-Predicate in Begriffsschrift?Junyeol Kim - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):191-203.
The Horizontal in Frege’s Begriffsschrift.Junyeol Kim - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11625-11644.
Frege on Truth, Assertoric Force and the Essence of Logic.Dirk Greimann - 2014 - History and Philosophy of Logic 35 (3):272-288.

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