Emotions and Reasons: An Enquiry Into Emotional Justification

New York: Routledge (1988)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In Emotions and Reasons, Patricia Greenspan offers an evaluative theory of emotion that assigns emotion a role of its own in the justification of action. She analyzes emotions as states of object-directed affect with evaluative propositional content possibly falling short of belief and held in mind by generalized comfort or discomfort

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 84,292

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
295 (#50,185)

6 months
6 (#146,313)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Patricia S. Greenspan
University of Maryland, College Park

Citations of this work

Slurring Perspectives.Elisabeth Camp - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (3):330-349.
The irrationality of recalcitrant emotions.Michael S. Brady - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):413 - 430.

View all 105 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references