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Emotions and Reasons: An Enquiry Into Emotional Justification
New York: Routledge (1988)
Abstract
In Emotions and Reasons, Patricia Greenspan offers an evaluative theory of emotion that assigns emotion a role of its own in the justification of action. She analyzes emotions as states of object-directed affect with evaluative propositional content possibly falling short of belief and held in mind by generalized comfort or discomfortAuthor's Profile
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Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification, by Patricia S. Greenspan. [REVIEW]Gabriele Taylor - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (3):716-719.
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Citations of this work
The logic, intentionality, and phenomenology of emotion.Michelle Montague - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):171-192.
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