Abstract

The primary aim of the dissertation is to reject the Principle of Epistemic Closure . PEC holds that if one knows that P, and knows that P entails Q, then one knows that Q. The virtue of rejecting PEC is that doing so provides a solution to the following puzzle: intuitively, we want to grant that we know things such as that we have hands. If I know that I have hands, and I know that my having hands entails that I am not a Brain in a Vat , then I know that I am not a BIV. This last claim, however, seems like something that I cannot know. So something has to give. By rejecting PEC, we are able to reject the claim that I know that I am not a BIV. In the first part of the dissertation I canvass, and ultimately reject, previous arguments against PEC . In the second part I offer my own qualified rejection of PEC. The third and fourth parts of the dissertation are dedicated to rejecting alternative solutions to the puzzle . The remainder of the dissertation is devoted to laying the foundation for a revised closure principle