Abstract
According to our folk theory of lying, liars leak observable cues of their insincerity, observable
cues that make it easy to catch a liar in real time. Various prominent social epistemologists rely
on the correctness of our folk theory as empirically well-confirmed when building their normative
accounts of the epistemology of testimony. Deception detection research in communication
studies, however, has shown that our folk-theory is mistaken. It is not empirically well-confirmed
but empirically refuted. Michaelian (2010) and Shieber (2012) have already discussed some of
this literature and its relevance for epistemology, especially for the most worked out reliance on
our folk theory by Elizabeth Fricker (1994, 2016, 2017a, 2024). Fricker (2016) raises a reasonable
objection to their presentations of the research: is the research ecologically valid? Do the
experiments in the lab carry over to real life? This chapter conveys the methodology of the
research, defends its ecological validity, and addresses further research on the nature and
frequency of lies in ordinary life. Social epistemologists stand to gain from understanding the
nuts and bolts of deception detection research and its findings. The chapter concludes with a
detailed examination of Fricker’s relilance on folk theory in her “local reductionist” epistemology
of testimony. Further areas of research relevant to social epistemology are listed.