Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness (review) [Book Review]

Journal of the History of Philosophy 3 (2):262-264 (1965)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:262 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Aristotle's Coneeplion of Moral Weakness. By James J. Walsh. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. Pp. viii ~- 199. $6.00.) The section of the Nicomachean Ethics in which Aristotle discusses at length the notion of akrasia or moral weakness (vii. 1-10) is one which as much as any other has evoked from philosophers a host of varying interpretations. One of the difficulties posed by Aristotle's remarks is that of determining what exactly his assessment is of Socrates' denial that there is such a phenomenon as moral weakness. Aristotle, it may be recalled, asserts in one passage (1145b 27-28) that the Socratic view "plainly clashes with the facts" and in another (1147b 14-15) that "the view which Socrates sought to establish seems to hold." Walsh maintains that Aristotle supports the Socratic position and the purpose of his book is "to prove this case in a thorough way" (p. 2). Beginning his study naturally enough with a discussion of the Socratic denial of akrasia, Walsh stresses the elements of choice and decision in the Socratic moral philosophy in order to balance recent accounts, like that of John Gould (Plato's Ethics, pp. 3-46), which take the Socratic ~mar~}u~ to be practical, i.e., a knowing how, rather than a knowing that, and thus to make plain both that the Socratic denial of akrasia is something more than a tautology and that an intellectualist theory of motivation is possible within the Socratic framework. Such a theory is that presented in the Protagoras and in coniunction with his summary of it Walsh presents a clear account of Euripides' dramatization of moral weakness as a phenomenon in which reason is motivationally insufficient. It is this picture of akrasia which Aristotle seems to have had in mind when he charges that Socrates' view contradicts the facts; in any event, according to Walsh, the modifications made by Plato in the Socratic doctrine represent an attempt by him to do justice to the psychological realism inherent in the Euripidean image (p. 27). In Plato's eudeavor (never fully worked out) to resolve the problem of moral weakness, there are, in Walsh's judgment, three distinguishable stages, the gradation occurring in time as well as in philosophical adequacy (p. 28).The development revealed in these stages isaway from the view that reason and knowledge alone are motivationally sufficientfor good action towards the view that the cooperation of 0v~ and a certain habituation of the appetities are essential alliesif reason is to be efficaciousin moral action. Walsh's thesis, in terms of this historical background, is that Aristotle, with his "strong emphasis on choice and decision and hence...the indispensability of knowledge or beliefto action," is more closely aligned with Socrates and the early Plato than with the later Plato (p. 29). In a masterfully argued and substantially evidenced chapter, Walsh deals with questions pertinent to his interpretation of Aristotle's conception of akrasia. In order to deal more at length with this interpretation, I give here only the conclusions of that chapter. (1) The ostensible conflict between accounts of the morally weak man as one in whom an inner struggle occurs and the account of the morally weak man which implies that such a struggle is not in fact occurring, all to be found in the Aristotelian treatise, are not irreconciliable. (2) The discussion of akrasia in Book vii of the Nicomachean Ethics would fit equally well in the Eudemian Ethics and in the Nicornachean Ethics, though in different ways. In the former it would function as a contribution to the discussion of several ethical notions, especially that of the voluntary; in the latter it would function rather as an appendix to Aristotle's treatment of moral virtue. (3) The Eudemian Ethics was written by Aristotle and was written before the Nicomachean Ethics. The psychology of movement is not affected by the alleged (Nuyens) shift in Aristotle's concept of the soul-body relationship from an instrumentist phase (De Partibus Animalium and De Moto Animalium) to a hylemorphic phase (De Anima). (4) With regard to the analysis of akrasia, there is no basic difference between the moral psychology...

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 99,596

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness. [REVIEW]C. D. - 1964 - Review of Metaphysics 18 (1):186-186.
Aristotle on pleasure and the worst form of akrasia.Devin Henry - 2002 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):255-270.
Aristotle's Theory of Moral Weakness: A New Look.Albert Richard Messner - 1988 - Dissertation, University of Missouri - Columbia
Akrasia and conflict in the Nicomachean Ethics.Mehmet Metin Erginel - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (4):573-593.
The Significance of Ephithumiai in Aristotle's Account of Akrasia.Patrick John Mooney - 1996 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
Aquinas, Aristotle, and Akrasia.Jean Alden Mccurdy Meade - 2000 - Dissertation, Tulane University
Aristotle's conception of moral weakness.James J. Walsh - 1960 - New York,: Columbia University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-08-28

Downloads
55 (#358,353)

6 months
5 (#918,198)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references