Transitivity and Transparency

Analytic Philosophy 57 (4):353-379 (2016)
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Abstract

Two popular theses central to recent theorizing about consciousness are the transitivity principle and the transparency of experience. According to the former, conscious mental states are mental states we are aware of in some way. According to the latter, there is some awareness-relation that we seemingly cannot bear to our experiences. I argue that, within certain reasonable constraints, there is no precisification of these theses that renders them compatible.

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Joseph Gottlieb
Texas Tech University

Citations of this work

On ambitious higher-order theories of consciousness.Joseph Gottlieb - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (3):421-441.
The Higher-Order Map Theory of Consciousness.Joseph Gottlieb - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):131-148.
Self-Experience Despite Self-Elusiveness.Joseph Gottlieb - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (4):1491-1504.

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References found in this work

Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
Brainstorms.Daniel Dennett - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 47 (2):326-327.
Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.

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