Omega Knowledge Matters

Oxford Studies in Epistemology (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

You omega know something when you know it, and know that you know it, and know that you know that you know it, and so on. This paper first argues that omega knowledge matters, in the sense that it is required for rational assertion, action, inquiry, and belief. The paper argues that existing accounts of omega knowledge face major challenges. One account is skeptical, claiming that we have no omega knowledge of any ordinary claims about the world. Another account embraces the KK thesis, and identifies knowledge with omega knowledge. This position faces counterexamples, and struggles to make sense of inexact knowledge. The paper then develops a new account of knowledge, by proposing the principle of Reflective Luminosity: if you know that you know something, then you omega know it. I argue that Reflective Luminosity allows for omega knowledge while avoiding the problems for KK.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion, Action, and Belief: A Teleological Account.Neil Mehta - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):681-705.
Disjunctive luminosity.Drew Johnson - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):118-126.
Contextualism and Knowledge Norms.Alex Worsnip - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge. pp. 177-189.
Assertion, action, and context.Robin McKenna & Michael Hannon - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):731-743.
Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm.Berit Brogaard - 2014 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 11-31.
You gotta believe.John Turri - 2014 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic norms: new essays on action, belief and assertion. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 193-199.
Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.John Turri - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):557-567.
Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-11.
Assertion, Implicature, and Iterated Knowledge.Eliran Haziza - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-03-16

Downloads
325 (#61,680)

6 months
148 (#23,374)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Simon Goldstein
University of Hong Kong

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

A logic for default reasoning.Ray Reiter - 1980 - Artificial Intelligence 13 (1-2):81-137.
Knowledge---by examples.Colin Radford - 1966 - Analysis 27 (1):1--11.
A defense of stable invariantism.Baron Reed - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):224-244.
Inexact knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 1992 - Mind 101 (402):217-242.

Add more references