Abstract

The dissertation attempts to think through the two Platonic dialogues, Symposium and Phaedrus, so far as both contribute to a single understanding of "eros." The work is divided into four chapters. ;The first chapter isolates two understandings of erotic impulse, one mythological and proper to the Archaic Age, one rationalistic and proper to the Greek Enlightenment. The second chapter investigates the Symposium in light of the archaic understanding, revealing the extent to which the earlier speeches proceed upon its tacit assumption, the extent to which the speech of Socrates corrects and surpasses these earlier speeches, and the extent to which the speech of Alcibiades makes this correction doubtful. Here it becomes evident that the Platonic Socrates understands erotic impulse as a relation to one eidos or idea; the attitude engendered through such relation is found to be eusebeia, "piety." The third chapter traces the argument of the Phaedrus from Lysias' speech through Socrates' first and second speeches through the culminating discussion of rhetoric, with reference made to the rationalistic understanding upon which Lysias' and Socrates' first speech rest, and to the question inherited from the Symposium, drawn out from Alcibiades' correction and accusation of Socrates. Through an analysis of Socrates' second speech and the myth that it employs, erotic impulse is again unveiled as a relation to one eidos or idea. Here it becomes evident why this eidos is that of Beauty itself; here also the characteristic attitude toward which such impulse tends, "piety," is given explicit determination. At the end it is shown that Socrates remains vulnerable to the charge of hubris, a vulnerability interpreted in light of the Socratic estimation of dialectic as the "truly rhetorical and persuasive art." The fourth chapter attempts to renew and answer the Socratic question, What is eros?, through asking a series of related questions: What precisely is the beauty of a beautiful thing? Why does the beauty of a beautiful thing arouse our sexuality? What results, precisely, when our innate, animal responsiveness is given over to reason? In what sense is the attitude of "piety," and not rather that of impiety, the inevitable outcome of the development of erotic impulse? The reading reaches its term with the statement of the fundamental position respecting "eros," and its negation, common to the two dialogues