The perception of consistency in attitudes

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 9 (6):491-501 (1973)
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Abstract

A study was conducted to test the hypothesis that when people change their attitudes they reduce the dissonance associated with the inconsistency of their new and previous positions by distorting their recall of their initial stand to make it consistent with their new attitude. Small groups of high school students discussed bussing, one of 30 pretested issues. An experimental confederate participated in each session with the task of effecting attitude change. After the discussion, the subjects' new attitudes were assessed and they were asked to duplicate their pretest scores. The results confirmed the hypothesis. Subjects distorted their recall of their initial stand on bussing so as to make it consistent with their new attitude. Such distortion allows persons to feel that their new position is the one they have always held. The subjects made such recall errors only on the bussing issue. Control subjects did not distort their original bussing attitudes

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