Abstract

In an earlier essay I argued that perception involves an assentive propositional attitude. This essay completes the argument by examining the three most familiar propositional attitudes in order to determine which is best suited to perception. In Part I, I examine the contention of C.A. Campbell that perception involves judging, and I conclude that judging is too deliberative to be the assentive attitude in perception. On the other hand, in Part II, a study of David Armstrong’s and and George Pitcher’s claims that perception involves belief concludes that belief is too dispositional to be the assentive attitude in perception. Finally, in Part III, I examine Cook Wilson’s notion of being under an impression that, H.H. Price’s notion of taking for granted, and Roderick Chisholm’s notion of sensible taking, and I conclude that taking is the assentive attitude best suited to perception since it is both spontaneous and an act