Goethe to Van gelder: Comments on "dynamical systems" models of cognition

Abstract

The "dynamical systems" model of cognitive processing is not an alternative computational model. The proposals about "computation" that accompany it are either vacuous or do not distinguish it from a variety of standard computational models. I conclude that the real motivation for van Gelder's version of the account is not technical or computational, but is rather in the spirit of natur-philosophie.

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Clark Glymour
Carnegie Mellon University

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Supervenience and neuroscience.Pete Mandik - 2011 - Synthese 180 (3):443 - 463.

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