Morals, Beliefs, and Counterfactuals

Brain and Behavioral Sciences 33 (4):337-338 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We have found that moral considerations interact with belief ascription in determining intentionality judgment. We attribute this finding to a differential availability of plausible counterfactual alternatives that undo the negative side-effect of an action. We conclude that Knobe's thesis does not account for processes by which counterfactuals are generated and how these processes affect moral evaluations.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,323

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A dilemma for the counterfactual analysis of causation.S. Barker - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):62 – 77.
Counterfactual scorekeeping.Anthony S. Gillies - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (3):329 - 360.
A Knobe Effect for Belief Ascriptions.James R. Beebe - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):235-258.
Indeterminism, counterfactuals, and causation.Richard Otte - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (1):45-62.
Do the Closest Counterfactual Worlds Contain Miracles?Phillip Goggans - 1992 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):137 - 149.
Counterfactuals with true components.Alan Penczek - 1997 - Erkenntnis 46 (1):79-85.
The entropy theory of counterfactuals.Douglas N. Kutach - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (1):82-104.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-12-01

Downloads
57 (#282,823)

6 months
4 (#798,550)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?