Theoria 86 (4):528-534 (
2020)
Copy
BIBTEX
Abstract
Federica Malfatti criticizes recent arguments against the possibility of understanding transmission. While she offers no positive argument for the claim that understanding can be transmitted, she does defend a liberal conception of transmission that allows for the possibility of understanding transmission. In this article, I have three aims. First, I will show that there is a stronger version of one of the arguments against understanding transmission that Malfatti considers, which avoids her objection. This argument also fails, however, and the reason it fails suggests that if understanding cannot be transmitted this is not due to the nature of epistemic trust. Second, I will offer a positive argument for understanding transmission on Malfatti's behalf, and defend the view of understanding on which it depends. Finally, I will raise a further challenge to the proponent of understanding transmission. The upshot is that although Malfatti is right that we have no clear reason to exclude the possibility of understanding transmission – and, if I am right, we have positive reason to accept it – nevertheless a puzzle remains about such transmission.