Humean Moral Pluralism

Oxford: Oxford University Press (2014)
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Abstract

Michael B. Gill offers a new account of Humean moral pluralism: the view that there are different moral reasons for action, which are based on human sentiments. He explores its historical origins, and argues that it offers the most compelling view of our moral experience. Together, pluralism and Humeanism make a philosophically powerful couple.

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Michael B. Gill
University of Arizona

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