Abstract

In the current discussion of criminal legislation and jurisdiction, two differing concepts of criminal law have become more and more prominent: “Criminal law for the citizen“ and “criminal law for the enemy”. These two concepts have been developed by G. Jakobs (Bonn), who not only was the first to recognise the emergence of a new type of criminal law “for the enemy”, but also provided a theoretical background for this notion. The article will explain Jacobs’ theory and discuss its capacity to convince from the perspective of a liberal legal philosophy. Based on the work of I. Kant, the author reflects first on Jakobs’ underlying differentiation between “individual” (as a naturally determined being that lives for the enjoyment of pleasure and the avoiding of pains) and “person” (as a subject capable of reflecting on right or wrong). Secondly, the author will consider and criticise Jakobs’ notions of prevention and punishment. Finally, it will be shown that there is no way of justifying a “criminal law for the enemy” in a liberal state.