This paper discusses various problems of explanations by mechanisms. Two positions are distinguished: the narrow position claims that only explanations by mechanisms are acceptable. It is argued that this position leads to an infinite regress because the discovery of a mechanism must entail the search for other mechanisms etc. Another paradoxical consequence of this postulate is that every successful explanation by mechanisms is unsatisfactory because it generates new ``black box'' explanations. The second – liberal – position that is advanced in (...) this paper regards, besides explanations by mechanisms, also the discovery of bivariate correlations as a first step of an explanation by mechanisms as meaningful. It is further argued that there is no contradiction between causal analysis and the explanation by mechanisms. Instead, explanations by mechanisms always presuppose the analysis of causal structures (but not vice versa). The final point is that an explanation by mechanisms is not inconsistent with the Hempel-Oppenheim scheme of explanation. (shrink)

This article addresses major arguments in the controversy about the “rationality” of moral behavior: can moral behavior be explained by rational choice theory (RCT)? The two positions discussed are the incentives thesis (norms are incentives as any other costs and benefits) and the autonomy thesis claiming that moral behavior has nothing to do with utility. The article analyses arguments for the autonomy thesis by J. Elster, A. Etzioni, and J. G. March and J. P. Olsen. Finally, the general claim is (...) discussed whether norm following and norm emergence are utility maximizing. The conclusion is that the autonomy thesis is not tenable if one applies a wide subjectivist, social psychological version of RCT that includes the assumption of “bounded rationality.” The autonomy thesis is only compatible with a narrow version of RCT that excludes internal outcomes and that refers to norms that do not have external outcomes. It is argued that such a narrow version is not capable of explaining many forms of behavior social scientists are interested in. (shrink)

The social science literature abounds with unconnected and, so it seems, diverse propositions about the emergence of norms. This article sets out to show that many of these propositions only differ in regard to terminology. Proponents of different theoretical orientations seem to accept a key hypothesis that is called “instrumentality proposition”: norms emerge if they are instrumental for attaining the goals of a group of actors. Apart from a problematic functionalist version the article focuses on an individualistic version: if actors (...) want to achieve certain goals and if a norm is instrumental to attain these goals individuals perform those actions that bring about the norm. This proposition involves several assumptions that are discussed.This version of the instrumentality proposition explains norms that are planned (i.e., that are second-order public goods). In order to account for the evolutionary emergence of norms a second version of the instrumentality proposition is discussed. It assumes that actors do not want to create a general norm but aim at providing certain private goods in interaction situations. For example, smokers sanction non-smokers in order not to be exposed to smoke in the interaction situation, but non-smokers do not want to engender a general non-smoking-norm. However, the aggregated effect of those actions is often a general norm.The article further explores problems of the two instrumentality propositions, the extent to which they answer important questions of a theory of norm emergence and alternative propositions to explain norms. (shrink)

The present paper focuses on the sociological model of man (also denoted as homo sociologicus or normative paradigm). It is discussed to what extent three problems limit its explanatory value: (1) behavior which is not normatively regulated and (2) behavior deviating from norms cannot be explained. (3) In case of norm conflicts it cannot be explained which of the normative expectations is followed. It is further discussed to what extent another model of man - which is called the “utilitarian”, “economic” (...) or rational choice model - is able to solve these problems. It is shown that the sociological model in fact consists of two different “utilitarian” models with very restrictive assumptions. Some of the problems of the sociological model are demonstrated by applying it to a well-known theory of role conflict. In the final section we discuss some consequences of the sociological model for the utilitarian approach. (shrink)

This contribution addresses the relation between (macro) hypotheses about social collectives (ranging from dyads to societies) on the one hand and (micro) hypotheses about individual actors on the other. This relation is the subject of methodological individualism (MI) and micro–macro modeling. Their ideas are first illustrated with an example: it is shown how the hypothesis that inequality is related to societal political violence can be explained by considering theories about individuals (i.e. micro theories) and relations between the macro and micro (...) factors (bridge assumptions). Next the components of micro–macro explanations are analyzed in detail. One question is whether macro and micro propositions and bridge assumptions are lawful statements, causal singular hypotheses or only correlations. It is shown that bridge assumptions can be empirical and analytical (i.e. logically true) statements. An example of the former is the impact of inequality on individual political deprivation, an example of the latter is the aggregation of individual crimes to the crime rate. After outlining the major arguments for micro–macro modeling and methodological individualism I illustrate their wide application in the social sciences. I conclude with a discussion of possible problems of micro–macro modeling and MI and a summary of the program of MI. (shrink)

This paper describes a research program that focuses on the explanation of political protest and its causes. The starting point is Mancur Olson’s theory of collective action. This theory is modified, extended and applied to explain political protest. In particular, it is argued that only a wide version of Rational Choice theory that includes ‘soft’ incentives as well as misperception is capable of providing valid explanations of protest behavior. Another part of the research program is the utilization of survey research (...) to test the predictions about protest behavior that are generated from the wide version of Rational Choice theory. The research program further aims at (a) comparing empirically Rational Choice and alternative propositions, (b) providing micro-macro explanatory models, (c) dynamic theoretical models, and (d) explaining preferences and beliefs which are usually treated as exogenous variables. The paper further reports, some results of the research program. (shrink)

Hans Albert war zu Beginn meines Studiums im Jahre 1959 an der Universität zu Köln wissenschaftlicher Assistent am Lehrstuhl von Gerhard Weisser in der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät. Die Namen der vielen Assistenten kannte man nur dann, wenn Sie Lehrveranstaltungen hielten oder wenn sie eigene Arbeiten betreuten. Trotzdem erfuhr ich von Hans Albert und seinen von der herrschenden Lehre abweichenden Ansichten schon zu Beginn meines Studiums. Wie sich bald zeigte, schienen die von ihm vertretenen Ansichten eine Reihe von Problemen zu lösen, die (...) wir – eine Gruppe von Studierenden – diskutierten. Um dies zu zeigen, sei kurz die Situation an der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Köln beschrieben. (shrink)

The rational choice approach focuses on explaining macrosocial phenomena or relationships by applying a theory about the behavior of individual actors. This paper addresses James S. Coleman’s account of micro-macro transitions involved in rational choice explanations. The starting point of this account is a macro-relationship. Its independent variable has a causal effect on the independent variable of a micro-relationship. The dependent variable of this relationship in turn influences the dependent variable of the macro-relationship (see Figure 1 of this paper). The (...) paper extends this account by delineating other types of micro-macro explanations and discusses some of its problems. (shrink)

In the previous issue of Analyse & Kritik (2020, vol. 42, issue 1) Alexander Vostroknutov (3-39) aims at a ‘synthesis’ of economics with ‘psychology, sociology, and evolutionary human biology.’ This paper argues that his approach needs to be complemented at least by work from sociologists and social psychologists. Starting with problems of defining and measuring norms it is then claimed that a theory of norms should address the origin, change and effects of norms and model micromacro processes. This should also (...) be the goal of a theory of institutions (which are defined here as sets of norms-norms in the sense of accepting oughtness statements). We show how the social psychological value expectancy theory can be applied to model the variety of incentives that could play a role in explaining the effects of norms. Regarding the origin Coleman’s theory of norms is applied to show how Vostroknutov’s dissatisfaction-norms hypothesis can be improved. (shrink)