Philosophical Studies 69 (2-3):315 - 327 (1993)

Authors
Allan Gibbard
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Abstract
I conclude that Gibbard fails to solve several of the traditional problems for expressivism. He solves some of these problems, but his solutions to them in effect give up expressivism. Of course, one might respond that it does not really matter whether his theory is expressivist. In some ways, I agree. Gibbard says many fascinating things about morality which have at most indirect connections to his expressivist analysis. I am thinking especially of his later discussions of hyperscepticism, parochialism, and indirect pragmatism. These views could still be developed even if he gave up expressivism. All I have tried to show here is that he does need to give up expressivism unless he can solve the problems that I have raised.
Keywords Expressivism   Ethics   Realism
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Reprint years 2006
DOI 10.1007/bf00990092
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References found in this work BETA

Spreading the Word. [REVIEW]Kent Bach - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (1):120.

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Citations of this work BETA

Moral Motivation Pluralism.Ragnar Francén - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (2):117-148.
Expressivism and Dispositional Desires.Caj Strandberg - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1):81-91.
How Emotivism Survives Immoralists, Irrationality, and Depression.Gunnar Björnsson - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):327-344.
Internalists Beware—We Might All Be Amoralists!Gunnar Björnsson & Ragnar Francén Olinder - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):1 - 14.

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