Manuscrito 25 (2):199-224 (2002)
AbstractWhat role does literal meaning play in people’s understanding of indirect and figurative language? Scholars from many disciplines have debated this issue for several decades. This chapter describes these debates, especially focusing on the arguments between the author and Marcelo Dascal. I suggest that Dascal’s defense of “moderate literalism” may have some validity, contrary to some of my earlier arguments against this point of view. The chapter acknowledges the strong contribution that Marcelo Dascal has made to interdisciplinary discussions on language and thought
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Can We Say What We Mean?: Expressibility and Background.Jesús Navarro-Reyes - 2009 - Pragmatics and Cognition 17 (2):283-308.
Can We Say What We Mean?: Expressibility and Background.Jesús Navarro - 2009 - Pragmatics and Cognition 17 (2):283-308.
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