Erkenntnis 40 (2):213 - 225 (1994)

Literal meaning is often identified with conventional meaning. In A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs Donald Davidson argues (1) that literal meaning is distinct from conventional meaning, and (2) that literal meaning is identical to what he calls first meaning. In this paper it is argued that Davidson has established (1) but not (2), that he has succeeded in showing that there is a distinction between literal meaning and conventional meaning but has failed to see that literal meaning and first meaning are also distinct. This failure is somewhat surprising, since it is through a consideration of Davidson's notion of radical interpretation that the distinction between literal meaning and first meaning becomes apparent.
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DOI 10.1007/BF01128593
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References found in this work BETA

Truth and Meaning.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):304-323.
Truth and Meaning.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):304-323.
Communication and Convention.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Synthese 59 (1):3 - 17.

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