The Basis Problem for Epistemological Disjunctivism Revisited

Erkenntnis 80 (6):1147-1156 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Duncan Pritchard has defended a version of epistemological disjunctivism which holds that in a paradigmatic case of perceptual knowledge, one knows that \ in virtue of having the reflectively accessible reason that one sees that \. This view faces what is known as the basis problem: if seeing that \ just is a way of knowing that \, then that one sees that \ cannot constitute the rational basis in virtue of which one knows that \. To solve this problem, Pritchard has argued that seeing that \ should be reduced to being in a good position to know that \ rather than simply knowing that \. I argue that this proposal can only be properly understood if the concept of knowledge is taken as primitive, and is supported by an example that either fails to favor it over the alternative, or else backfires against the proposal itself. This leaves the new account of seeing that \ unmotivated, thereby challenging the purported answer to the basis problem



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,698

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Formulation of Epistemological Disjunctivism.Craig French - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):86-104.
Zalabardo on Pritchard and the Evidential Problem.Tommaso Piazza - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (3):199-205.


Added to PP

85 (#197,197)

6 months
12 (#312,095)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Harmen Ghijsen
Radboud University

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.
The nature and value of knowledge: three investigations.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock.
Epistemological disjunctivism.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

View all 16 references / Add more references