Knowing what's Not Up the Road by Seeing what's Right in Front of You: Epistemological disjunctivism's Fake Barn Problem

Episteme 12 (3):401-412 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Epistemological Disjunctivism (ED) is the view that rational support for paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge that P comes from seeing that P – a state that is both factive and reflectively accessible. ED has the consequence that if I see that there is a barn before me, I can thereby be in a position to know that I am not in fake barn country. It is argued that this is a problem. The problem is distinct from familiar complaints about Neo-Mooreanism and easy knowledge. Potential ways of avoiding this problem are proposed. It is argued that they do not succeed. There is a way out of ED's fake barn problem but many will likely find it inhospitable.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,745

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-05-08

Downloads
117 (#43,168)

6 months
19 (#786,843)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Veber
East Carolina University

Citations of this work

Biased Knowers, Biased Reasons, and Biased Philosophers.Michael Veber - forthcoming - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-11.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.
The obscure object of hallucination.Mark Johnston - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):113-83.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:191-220.
Basic knowledge and the problem of easy knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.
Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge.Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.) - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 9 references / Add more references