Abstract

In this dissertation I develop a unique virtue ethical approach to morality. Whereas most contemporary philosophers who are attracted to virtue ethics write about traditional Aristotelian virtue ethics, I develop a version in the tradition of the British moral sentimentalists. This approach, known as agent-based virtue ethics, differs from standard virtue ethical accounts in that it does not base ethical evaluations on character traits, the possession of which are necessary for eudaimonia. Rather, agent-based virtue ethics dictates that an act's moral evaluation is entirely determined by the motives of the agent performing the act. An act that expresses a virtuous motive is morally right. I call my approach Morality as Restricted Benevolence, because the only motive or virtue I utilize is benevolence. However, whereas benevolence is typically considered to be one motive, I conclude that there are four different types of benevolence: the desire to help those in need , the desire to stand on one's own two feet , gratitude and sheer benevolence, which covers benevolent acts that do not fall into first three categories. I conclude that acts motivated by either of the first three take priority over those motivated by sheer benevolence, all things being equal. After constructing my theory, I attempt to demonstrate that it yields ethical judgments that substantially conform to our common-sense moral intuitions in cases concerning the distribution of benefits and burdens and cases concerning rules such as "one ought not lie." Hence, morality as restricted benevolence is a promising alternative to Kantian and utilitarian approaches to morality. ;In the second half of my dissertation, I apply my ethical theory to the law. I argue that a just law, like a moral act, is one that expresses one of the four restricted forms of benevolence. Since it may seem strange to claim that a law can express benevolence, I attempt to make sense of this claim. I conclude by applying my theory to the issue of punishment