Priest and Nagel on Being Someone: A Refutation of Physicalism

Heythrop Journal 49 (4):648-651 (2008)
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Abstract

Physicalism entails that a possible world which is a minimal physical duplicate of the actual world be a duplicate simpliciter of the actual world. Because what I really am is not a particular human being, there exists a minimal physical duplicate of the actual world which is not a duplicate simpliciter of the actual world. Therefore, physicalism is false.

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Benedikt Paul Göcke
Ruhr-Universität Bochum

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References found in this work

The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
Theories of the mind.Stephen Priest - 1991 - New York, N.Y., USA: Penguin Books.
Physicalism, supervenience, and dependence.Paul K. Moser & J. D. Trout - 1995 - In Elias E. Savellos & Ümit D. Yalçin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 187--217.

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