In the lab and the field: Punishment is rare in equilibrium

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (1):26 - 28 (2012)
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Abstract

I argue that field (experimental) studies on (costly) peer punishment in social dilemmas face the problem that in equilibrium punishment will be rare and therefore may be hard to observe in the field. I also argue that the behavioral logic uncovered by lab experiments is not fundamentally different from the behavioral logic of cooperation in the field

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