Spinoza's Monistic Metaphysics of Substance and Mode

In Yitzhak Y. Melamed (ed.), A Companion to Spinoza. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. pp. 93–107 (2021)
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Abstract

Commentators have offered interpretations over many years of the nature and status of the attributes in Spinoza's metaphysics, but attributes are best understood as diverse manners of existence, so that a substance having more than one attribute exists in more than one manner. Spinoza's monistic metaphysics of substance and mode allows him to offer an appealing conception of the nature of space. Spinoza's monistic metaphysics provides the basis for a positive account of how particular things constitute things at all. All the philosophers of the seventeenth century, arguably none has more direct bearing on recent work in metaphysics than Spinoza. In Spinoza's monism, there is only one perfectly real being, which grounds and is more real than all of the other existing things, and in which they inhere. Spinoza's panpsychism at the same time provides a model of cosmopsychism, in which the mental character of the cosmos grounds the mental character of each particular thing.

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Don Garrett
New York University

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