What are Emotions For? From Affective Epistemology to Affective Ethics

Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):123-134 (2019)
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Abstract

What would it mean for an emotion to successfully “recognize” something about an object toward which it is directed? Although the notion of "emotional recognition" is central to Rick Furtak’s _Knowing Emotions_, the text does not provide an account of this concept that enables us to assess the extent to which a given emotional response is recognitive. This article draws from the text to articulate a novel account of emotional recognition. According to this account, emotional recognition can be assessed not only in terms of the “accuracy” of an emotional construal in a strictly epistemological sense, but also in terms of the quasi-ethical ideal of responding emotionally to what we encounter in ways that are “specific,” “deep," and “balanced."

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Francisco Gallegos
Wake Forest University

Citations of this work

Affective injustice and fundamental affective goods.Francisco Gallegos - 2021 - Journal of Social Philosophy 53 (2):185-201.

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