Abstract
After the works of Jaako Hintikka, David Stern and, more recently, Denis Perrin, the idea that there is a wittgensteinian reflection upon the time and that it is at the origin of the abandonment of the project of a phenomenological language is nothing surprising, but we cannot consider it established yet. It seems to me that an important element in this debate is in chapter VII of the Philosophical Remarks : indeed, we find there the very first sustained discussion on the possibility of a phenomenological language —a discussion obviously centred on the question of time. Without aiming to propose an “alternative” reading of Wittgenstein’ reflections on time and the phenomenological language, I would like to bring to light the importance of this chapter for this problem and also try to show that the interpretation key must be looked for in a reductio ad absurdum whose base is the impossibility to measure time.