Abstract
In a series of articles, the most extensive of which are [9] and [10], Carl R.
Kordig has attacked the "new empiricism" of the late Norwood R. Hanson, P. K.
Feyerabend, Thomas S. Kuhn, and Stephen E. Toulmin. While there are differ-
ences among the views of these philosophers, they agree at least on the following
claims: (1) scientific method does not proceed inductively from neutral observations
because (a) observations are not free of interpretation; and (b) scientists, as a
matter of history, have not used induction as the means of arriving at scientific
laws; and (2) the key to scientific progress is the discovery of theories, hypotheses,
or paradigms which order phenomena and influence the ways in which data are
experienced. While Kordig admits that the new empiricism has the valuable effect
of underscoring the truth that scientific revolutions do not consist merely in finding
new facts or in paying closer attention to already known facts, contrary to the new
view, he maintains that observations must be and are neutral ([9], pp. 478-479).
Kordig contends against the new empiricists that if observations are not neutral but
theory-laden, then it is impossible to test, compare and verify theories. Conse-
quently, Kordig concludes that the new empiricist view implies that scientific
progress is impossible ([9], pp. 470-471; [10j, p. 470). In opposition to their view,
Kordig maintains that observations are neutral and independent of theories (and
this was the insight of the logical empiricists) ([10], p. 468); and moreover, observa-
tions must be neutral to and independent of theory in order that (a) differing
theories may be truly said to compete and (b) the observations may be the basis of
testing and deciding between competing theories.