Philosophy of Science 40 (3):415-432 (1973)

Abstract
In a series of articles, the most extensive of which are [9] and [10], Carl R. Kordig has attacked the "new empiricism" of the late Norwood R. Hanson, P. K. Feyerabend, Thomas S. Kuhn, and Stephen E. Toulmin. While there are differ- ences among the views of these philosophers, they agree at least on the following claims: (1) scientific method does not proceed inductively from neutral observations because (a) observations are not free of interpretation; and (b) scientists, as a matter of history, have not used induction as the means of arriving at scientific laws; and (2) the key to scientific progress is the discovery of theories, hypotheses, or paradigms which order phenomena and influence the ways in which data are experienced. While Kordig admits that the new empiricism has the valuable effect of underscoring the truth that scientific revolutions do not consist merely in finding new facts or in paying closer attention to already known facts, contrary to the new view, he maintains that observations must be and are neutral ([9], pp. 478-479). Kordig contends against the new empiricists that if observations are not neutral but theory-laden, then it is impossible to test, compare and verify theories. Conse- quently, Kordig concludes that the new empiricist view implies that scientific progress is impossible ([9], pp. 470-471; [10j, p. 470). In opposition to their view, Kordig maintains that observations are neutral and independent of theories (and this was the insight of the logical empiricists) ([10], p. 468); and moreover, observa- tions must be neutral to and independent of theory in order that (a) differing theories may be truly said to compete and (b) the observations may be the basis of testing and deciding between competing theories.
Keywords N. R. Hanson  Theory-dependence of observation
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/288544
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,259
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Patterns of Discovery.Norwood R. Hanson, A. D. Ritchie & Henryk Mehlberg - 1960 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (40):346-349.
The Theory-Ladenness of Observation.Carl R. Kordig - 1971 - Review of Metaphysics 24 (3):448 - 484.
The Comparability of Scientific Theories.Carl R. Kordig - 1971 - Philosophy of Science 38 (4):467-485.
Brett's History of Psychology.Henry H. Ferguson & R. S. Peters - 1955 - Philosophical Quarterly 5 (18):94.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Observational Invariance.Carl R. Kordig - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (4):558-569.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Theory-Ladenness and Theory Comparison.William B. Jones - 1978 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978:83 - 92.
Theory-Ladenness of Perception Arguments.Michael A. Bishop - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:287 - 299.
Observation and Growth in Scientific Knowledge.Robert Nola - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:245 - 257.
Theory-Ladenness of Observations as a Test Case of Kuhn's Approach to Scientific Inquiry.Jaakko Hintikka - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:277-286.
The Theory-Ladenness of Observation.Carl R. Kordig - 1971 - Review of Metaphysics 24 (3):448 - 484.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
32 ( #358,753 of 2,518,688 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #408,186 of 2,518,688 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes