The Theory-Ladenness of Observation

Review of Metaphysics 24 (3):448 - 484 (1971)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Feyerabend claims that what is perceived depends upon what is believed ; and he maintains that among really efficient alternative theories "each theory will possess its own experience, and there will be no overlap between these experiences". According to Feyerabend "scientific theories are ways of looking at the world; and their adoption affects our general beliefs and expectations, and thereby also our experiences...". Toulmin, Hanson, and Kuhn concur with this view. Toulmin claims that men who accept different "ideals" and "paradigms" will see different phenomena. He thinks theories not only give significance to facts, but also determine what facts are for us at all. Like Feyerabend, Toulmin asserts that "we see the world through" our fundamental concepts of science "to such an extent that we forget what it would look like without them". Indeed, both Feyerabend and Toulmin would have previous thinkers "live in an observational world very different from our own". Kuhn expresses quite similar views. He feels that

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Kordig and the theory-ladenness of observation.George Gale & Edward Walter - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (3):415-432.
Theory-Ladenness of Perception Arguments.Michael A. Bishop - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:287 - 299.
Observation and Growth in Scientific Knowledge.Robert Nola - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:245 - 257.
Theory-Ladenness of Observations as a Test Case of Kuhn's Approach to Scientific Inquiry.Jaakko Hintikka - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:277-286.
Theory-Ladenness and Theory Comparison.William B. Jones - 1978 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978:83 - 92.
Observationality: Quine and the Epistemological Nihilists.P. William Bechtel & Eric Stiffler - 1978 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978:93 - 108.
Theory-ladenness of evidence: A case study from history of chemistry.K. P. - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (2):351-368.
Observation reconsidered.Jerry Fodor - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (March):23-43.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-05-29

Downloads
48 (#293,199)

6 months
1 (#1,042,085)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Whewell’s hylomorphism as a metaphorical explanation for how mind and world merge.Ragnar van der Merwe - 2023 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 54 (1):19-38.
Kuhn reconstructed: Incommensurability without relativism.Michael E. Malone - 1991 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 24 (1):69-93.
The comparability of scientific theories.Carl R. Kordig - 1971 - Philosophy of Science 38 (4):467-485.
Data identity and perspectivism.Franklin Jacoby - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11695-11711.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references