Abstract

An interpretation of Mill's argument for freedom of speech in On Liberty is given. It is called the Central Argument. It is an argument that there are no good reasons to censor. In his strongest case Mill argues that were it considered a good reason to censor a statement because it was false and censoring it would minimally benefit the formation of true beliefs, this would lead to censorship in a cluster of cases in which the truth would be suppressed and harm done to the formation of true belief above an acceptable threshold. Therefore even when a claim is false it is not a good reason to censor it. Nor are there other good reasons to censor. This argument is distinguished from the Infallibility Argument which has traditionally been taken to be Mill's main argument. The Central Argument is a much stronger consequentialist argument. ;Mill's critics are right in their criticisms of the Infallibility Argument. These criticisms are not effective against the Central Argument. The Central Argument recognizes that we are certain some claims are false but it is still unjustified to censor them. ;To rule out censorship altogether Mill must show there is no good reason to censor. A distinction is made between limited and unlimited censorship. It is plausible that Mill's argument is effective against unlimited censorship. It must also be effective against limited censorship. Mill must claim that there is overriding risk that limited censorship will become unlimited censorship. Several empirical assumptions must be made: that the risk of government abuse is significantly high; that the risks are significantly high that the public would accept unlimited censorship if it accepted limited censorship; that limited censorship can be expected to increase overall repression and not reduce it. These empirical assumptions are not obviously right and Mill does not defend them. The crucial case for Mill is one in which speech will do substantial harm to the lives and well-being of a group of people, the speech will be persuasive and cannot be expected to be rebutted in free discourse and censorship could substantially reduce this harm. ;The second essay argues against the right of a publisher to determine newspaper policy, and for the right of the reporter to participate in the determination of newspaper policy. It is a consequentialist argument for the right to a positive freedom in terms of the consequences to the epistemological goods Mill discussed in On Liberty. Publishers have a strong relevant self-interest in the news. On a rational reconstruction reporters will be substantially influenced by publishers. Publisher determination of news policy will lead to publication of news in a cluster of cases which will harm the formation of true belief above an acceptable threshold. There are no overriding benefits. Sociological arguments and evidence support this claim. Therefore the publisher does not have a right to determine news policy. Objections to this argument rest on empirical assumptions that there is effective competition among substantively different newspapers and there is a wide enough range of newspapers for the reader to recognize distorted news. Under present circumstances these assumptions are not warranted. ;The harm done to published news is below the level of harm done by censorship but above an acceptable threshold of harm. It is neither feasible nor likely that readers will, often enough, form true beliefs about news. It will not lead to the most adequate news coverage. ;If reporters have a right to participate in determination of news policy a barrier to impartial news coverage will be reduced. The formation of true belief will be benefited