Synthese 198 (3):2427-2447 (2019)

Authors
James Nguyen
Stockholm University
Abstract
Veritism, the position that truth is necessary for epistemic acceptability, seems to be in tension with the observation that much of our best science is not, strictly speaking, true when interpreted literally. This generates a paradox: truth is necessary for epistemic acceptability; the claims of science have to be taken literally; much of what science produces is not literally true and yet it is acceptable. We frame Elgin’s project in True Enough as being motivated by, and offering a particular resolution to, this paradox. We discuss the paradox with a focus on scientific models and argue that there is another resolution available which is compatible with retaining veritism: rejecting the idea that scientific models should be interpreted literally.
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-019-02222-9
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References found in this work BETA

How the Laws of Physics Lie.Nancy Cartwright - 1983 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
True Enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2017 - Cambridge: MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Do Fictions Explain?James Nguyen - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3219-3244.
The Truth About Better Understanding?Lewis Ross - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-24.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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