Status Quo Basing and the Logic of Value

Economics and Philosophy 15 (1):23 (1999)
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Abstract

Some writers have noted that valuation is often focused on foreseen changes. They say that we often don't value situations in terms of what we would have in them only but also in terms of the gains or losses that they offer us — that we then focus on departures from our status quo. They argue that such thinking conflicts with basic economic analysis, and also that it violates logic: they say that it is irrational. I agree that it seems to be common. But is such a way of setting one's values a challenge to economics? And does it conflict with being rational?

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Citations of this work

The Varieties of Instrumental Rationality.Stephen Ellis - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):199-220.
The Varieties of Instrumental Rationality.Stephen Ellis - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):199-220.

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References found in this work

The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
What is equality? Part 2: Equality of resources.Ronald Dworkin - 1981 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (4):283 - 345.
Understanding Action: An Essay on Reasons.Frederic Schick - 1991 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Morality and Rational Choice.J. Baron - 1993 - Springer Verlag.
Making choices: a recasting of decision theory.Frederic Schick - 1997 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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