In this book, Mark LeBar develops Virtue Eudaimonism, which brings the philosophy of the ancient Greeks to bear on contemporary problems in metaethics, especially the metaphysics of norms and the nature of practical rationality.

One important objection to virtue ethical theories is that they apparently must account for the wrongness of a wrong action in terms of a lack of virtue (or presence of vice) in the agent, and not in terms of the effects of the action on its victim. We take such effects to ground deontic constraints on how we may act, and virtue theory appears unable to account for such constraints. I claim, however, that eudaimonist virtue theory can account for wrongness (...) in just this way. I draw on recent work by Stephen Darwall on the “second-person standpoint,” in which we see others as independent sources of claims on us —as sources of “deontic constraints.” We have reason to occupy that standpoint as a matter of virtue, and thus virtuous agents should and will have reasons to respect deontic constraints. I argue for this claim as an element of a plausible eudaimonist virtue theory, and rebut objections that the view misunderstands the nature of or reasons for respecting such constraints. (shrink)

Constructivism about practical judgments, as I understand it, is the notion that our true normative judgments represent a normative reality, while denying that that reality is independent of our exer-cise of moral and practical judgment. The Kantian strain of practical constructivism (through Kant himself, John Rawls, Christine Korsgaard, and others) has been so influential that it is tempting to identify the constructivist approach in practical domains with the Kantian development of the out-look. In this essay I explore a somewhat different (...) variety of practical constructivism, which I call Aristotelian Constructivism. My aim is to establish conceptual space for this form of constructivism by indicating both in what ways it agrees with its Kantian counterparts and in what ways it differs. I argue that Aristotelian Constructivism is on one sense more faithful to the constructivist enterprise than the Kantian varieties, in that its understanding of both the establishment of practical truth and the vindication of the theory itself is constructivist. (shrink)

Some of the earliest Western ideas about the virtues of character gave justice a prominent position, but if moral philosophy has made any progress at all in the past two centuries, we might think it worthwhile to reconsider what that virtue involves. Kant seems (even to most non-Kantians) to have crystallized something important to our relations with others in formulating a proscription against treating others merely as means. And twentieth-century moral and political theory put the justice of social institutions in (...) the spotlight in an unprecedented way. Here I explore the significance of these developments for what it is to be a just person (the nature of “individual justice”) as it was originally understood, within the eudaimonist virtue-ethical theories of the ancient Greeks. By any standard, ancient thinking about individual justice seems to have been incomplete in important ways; perhaps, in virtue of these advances in moral theory, we are in position to enrich our thinking about it. (shrink)

Kant’s moral theory is sometimes thought to mandate public welfare provision on grounds of beneficence or Kant’s commitment to freedom. However, at no point does Kant argue for welfare in these ways. Instead, the rationale he offers is that public welfare provision is instrumentally necessary for the security and the stability of the state. I argue that this is no oversight on Kant’s part. I consider plausible alternative arguments for public welfare provision, and show why Kant does not espouse them. (...) I conclude that the only viable Kantian justification for welfare is just the one Kant gives. (shrink)

David Owens argues that we have interests in purely normative phenomena—in particular, in being obligated. That is, obligation is valuable not merely because our more obvious and non-normative interests are served via being obligated and doing what we are obligated to do, but because the various ways in which we obligate ourselves to others, and they to us, are valuable in and of themselves. This is our ‘normative landscape’, and we shape that landscape through our various normative undertakings, such as (...) making promises, consenting, forgiving, and the like. This way of thinking about obligation is highly inviting, and Owens’ careful exploration of both the landscape and the tools we deploy to shape it mark a significant advance in our understanding of ourselves as creatures susceptible to norms and normativity. (shrink)

Theories of human well-being struggle with a tension between opposing intuitions: on the one hand, that our welfare is subjectively determined by us as individuals, and on the other that there are objective constraints on what can count as our good. I argue that accounts driven primarily by subjectivist intuitions fail to come to grips with the signific-ance of objectivist intuitions, by failing to explain where our objectivist intuitions come from and why they are important, and defend an alternative account (...) of human welfare – what I call Aristotelian Constructivism. (shrink)

Plato extends a bold, confident, and surprising empirical challenge. It is implicitly a claim about the psychological — more specifically motivational — economies of human beings, asserting that within each such economy there is a desire to live well. Call this claim ‘psychological eudaimonism’ (‘PE’). Further, the context makes clear that Plato thinks that this desire dominates in those who have it. In other words, the desire to live well can reliably be counted on (when accompanied with correct beliefs about (...) the role of morality or virtue in living well) to move people be virtuous. As we will argue, this general claim appears in not only Plato but Aristotle and the Stoics as well. But it is one we might wonder about, in three ways. First, we might wonder about its warrant. After all, the claim is universal in scope; yet it is about a highly contingent fact about the motivational propensities of individual human organisms, and there is abundant variability in the individual forms human nature takes. What grounds could the ancients have for their confidence that there are no outliers (assuming, as we do, that they do not merely misspeak in framing general claims as universal ones)? Second, we might wonder about its truth. For were it true, it would entail something remarkable about the nature of rationality that we (post-)moderns would be wise to heed. And third, we might wonder about its relationship with normative eudaimonism. By ‘normative eudaimonism’ (‘NE’) we mean the claim that we have conclusive reason to act in ways that conduce to our own eudaimonia. As we will show, the key to these three questions is the first. If we consider what justification the ancients have for their claim, we can see why that claim must be true. Moreover, as we will also show, it must be true because of the nature of practical rationality as the ancients understood it — that is, in terms of normative eudaimonism. We will show this by marshalling unexpected resources: Donald Davidson’s work in understanding how we interpret others and in so doing make sense of them as rational beings. If we couple Davidson’s account of interpretation with the eudaimonist structure of practical rationality essential to these ancient ethical theories, psychological eudaimonism is a consequence. The paper proceeds as follows. In Section I, we lay out the textual basis for ascribing PE to Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. In Section II, we introduce Davidson’s account of interpretation. This allows us to appropriate that account in Section III to the particular purposes of normative eudaimonism, to support the claim that we must ascribe the desire to live well to those whom we would see as rational. Finally, in Section IV we consider challenges to this strategy. (shrink)

Response-dependent accounts of value claim that to understand what we are saying about the objects of our value judgments, we must take into account the responses those objects provoke. Recent discussions of the proposal that value is response-dependent are obscured by dogmas about response-dependence, that (1) response-dependency must be known a priori, (2) must hold necessarily, and (3) the terms involved must designate rigidly. These “dogmas” stand in the way of formulating and assessing a clear conception of value as response-dependent. (...) I point out these dogmas and argue that there is no good reason for subscribing to them. (shrink)

Response-dependent accounts of value claim that to understand what we are saying about the objects of our value judgments, we must take into account the responses those objects provoke. Recent discussions of the proposal that value is response-dependent are obscured by dogmas about response-dependence, that (1) response-dependency must be known a priori, (2) must hold necessarily, and (3) the terms involved must designate rigidly. These “dogmas” stand in the way of formulating and assessing a clear conception of value as response-dependent. (...) I point out these dogmas and argue that there is no good reason for subscribing to them. (shrink)

Justice is a virtue that speaks to our time and has been sought and celebrated since it was conceptualized in ancient Greece. Foregrounding new and fascinating research in philosophy and psychology, as well as other empirical fields of study, the essays in this volume explore the breadth and significance of current understandings of justice, with an emphasis on justice as a virtue that individuals can cultivate in themselves and others.

Daniel Haybron’s recent book, The Pursuit of Unhappiness, includes a defense of a normative notion of well-being. Haybron’s main contribution is to argue that a central component of well-being is the fulfillment of one’s “emotional nature,” that is, fulfillment as a unique individual who is such as to find happiness in some things rather than others. We argue that the contrast he draws between his view and “Aristotelian” views of well-being is problematic in two ways. First, Haybron says that unlike (...) the self-fulfillment theory, Aristotelian theories of well-being are “perfectionist” theories; we argue that Haybron’s concerns about “perfectionism” should be distinguished from Aristotelian eudaimonist theory. Second, Haybron’s self-fulfillment theory makes an individual’s well-being wholly dependent on that individual’s make-up, and we argue that that is a bad fit with our considered convictions about well-being. (shrink)

Rationalist opponents of Instrumentalism believe that reason can and should play some further role in determining our ends. Instrumentalists deny this: reason can generate only reasons for taking the necessary means to ends established antecedently by conative states. I argue that Instrumentalism cannot make adequate sense of the notion of ends. Instrumentalism requires a non-rational way of identifying ends and ascribing rational force to them, and there appears to be none consistent with Instrumentalism’s commitments. As an alternative I outline what (...) I refer to as an Aristotelian conception of practical reason as a promising way of understanding practical rationality. (shrink)

Various theorists have offered accounts of how a virtue ethical theory might inform a political theory — here meaning a theory of political legitimacy and authority. These theories claim to support a liberal regimen of authority, and they do, but only to a limited extent. -/- What they cannot support is a justificatory liberal authority structure. Each of the accounts given would authorize coercive force to impose on holders of other theories decisions counter to the values endorsed by those other (...) theories. -/- This is, or should be, a problem for those theories, especially the neo-Aristotelian theories which give pride of place to the exercise of practical rationality and self-direction. They would seem to run afoul of Hursthouse’s Constraint, which requires that a political theory not require vicious action of agents. In authorizing or requiring coercive intervention to advance one’s own conception of the good, at the expense of the authority of those subject to the coercion to advance their own conception of the good, these theories authorize or require vicious action. -/- Defenders of these accounts might meet this challenge in various ways. They might deny that virtue requires justifying coercive action as justificatory liberalism requires. But their focus on self-direction, and the plausibility of the requirement of mutual recognition make this response unattractive. -/- A better way is to augment the theories with a virtue which consists in standing in a relationship of mutual recognition and treating others accordingly. Such a virtue ethic is congruent with the requirements of justificatory liberalism. (shrink)

Kant claims that autonomy is possible only if the law that determines the will disregards any incentive grounded in the natural world. Here I develop and defend an alternative notion of autonomy, drawn from the ancient eudaimonists, on which practical reason is grounded in our interest in living well. This allows eudaimonism a conception of the autonomy of the will in which (like Kant’s) the will is the source of its own laws, but in which (unlike Kant’s) it has an (...) object that is thoroughly situated in the empirical world. (shrink)

In “Two-Level Eudaimonism and Second-Personal Reasons,” Bradford Cokelet argues that we should reject one strategy—one I advanced earlier in this journal—for reconciling a virtue-ethical theoretical framework with that part of our moral experience that has been described as second-personal reasons. Cokelet frames a number of related objections to that strategy, and his concerns are worth taking up. Addressing them provides an opportunity both to revisit and develop the model bruited in my earlier article and to gain additional insight into second-personal (...) reasons and associated relations of accountability. (shrink)

Teichmann’s book is a contemplative study of issues in ethics and language, in two senses. First, it is characteristic of the style of the book, which is as much ruminative as argumentative. Second, a consistent theme in the book is the significance of what Teichmann takes Aristotle to be after in advocating a life of contemplation as our highest end. Early on Teichmann reminds us of Wittgenstein’s references to ‘pictures’ or ‘ways of seeing’ things that frame the questions we ask (...) and determine what will count as adequate answers (§1.ix). Teichmann can be seen as exploring one such picture, in which questions about human nature, human lives, reasons, and language interact in ways that are mutually illuminating. This picture is not perhaps in the mainstream of contemporary moral philosophy, but Teichmann’s development of it is insightful and provocative. It emerges through broad discussions in five chapters. (shrink)

In the ethical theories of the ancient Greeks, eudaimonia provided a grounding for the value of all other goods. But a puzzle for such views is that some things are good for us irrespective of the intervention of eudaimonia and its requirement of virtuous activity. In this article, the author considers challenges to the eudaimonist account of value on those grounds pressed by Nicholas Wolterstorff and Sophie Grace Chappell. The aim is ethical-theoretical, rather than historical. The author defends the thesis (...) that a form of eudaimonism that is largely Aristotelian in form and content can meet these challenges. (shrink)

This paper reconsiders the relationship between the personal and the common good within an Aristotelian conception of the virtuous and happy life. Thinking about that relationship requires that we face up to a central tension in the Aristotelian ethical outlook. That approach is rooted in the value of eudaimonia — of living well, of happiness. That is something like the personal good. At the same time, on the Aristotelian picture no form of human life can be good if it is (...) not one we can live with others of our kind; that requires something like a common good. It is difficult to spell out both those ideas fully in such a way that they fit together well. Nonetheless, I believe that Aristotle’s framework (although not the specifics of his own theory) offers us the best prospects of doing so, and sketch a way of connecting the personal and common goods within that framework. (shrink)

No Abs Richard Kraut’s What is Good and Why is a development and defense of devel-opmentalism. But Kraut’s approach renders problematic the relationship between good-for and reasons for action. One consequence is uncertainty as to how exactly anybody’s good becomes reason-giving for us, given that there is no immediate connection between anyone’s good and reasons for action. A further problem can be seen in trying to identify a basis for thinking we are beings entitled to respect. Finally, Kraut’s work leaves (...) unexplicated the “matching relation” he says holds between a living being and what is good for it.tract. (shrink)

Talbot Brewer seeks to follow Elizabeth Anscombe, Iris Murdoch, and Alasdair MacIntyre in "retrieving" philosophical ethics from the grip of bad questions and worse answers. This is an ambitious aim, and Brewer may not entirely succeed. But if he falls short it is in an intelligent, rich, and fecund way. It is what moral philosophy can be like at its best.

If ever there were a time in which concerns about equality as a primary issue for social policy disappeared from public view, now is not that time. Recent work in economics on inequality has climbed to the top of best-sellers lists, and the issue was a major talking point in American midterm elections in 2014. The sheer bewildering volume of scholarship and discussion of equality makes it difficult to distinguish signal from noise. What, of all that we know about ways (...) in which we are equal and ways in which we are unequal, matters? If, as seems plausible, we neither are nor should desire to be equal in every respect that we could in theory be equal, in which ways ought we to care about being equal? Does the kind of equality of outcome — perhaps equality of income or wealth — that is frequently the focus of discussion matter most? Does opportunity matter more? What about less material forms of equality such as equality of status, or power, or authority? How do these various forms of equality interact with each other? The essays in this volume represent the work of a number of leading scholars from different disciplines on these questions. Drawing on sources in philosophical analysis, empirical science, and history, they sort through competing claims and counterclaims about the intuitions that drive our concern for equality. Their conclusions are not in unison, but nonetheless represent important advances in our attempts to grapple with this crucial social value. (shrink)

In recent decades "virtue ethics" has become an accepted theoretical structure for thinking about normative ethical principles. However, few contemporary virtue ethicists endorse the commitments of the first virtue theorists---the ancient Greeks, who developed their virtue theories within a commitment to eudaimonism. Why? I believe the objections of modern theorists boil down to concerns that eudaimonist theories cannot properly account for two prominent moral requirements on our treatment of others. ;First, we think that the interests and welfare of at least (...) some others ought to give us non-instrumental reason for acting---that is, reason independent of consideration of our own welfare. Second, we think others are entitled to what we might call respect, just in virtue of their being persons. Eudaimonist accounts either cannot account for these intuitions at all, or they give the wrong sort of account. ;My dissertation assesses the resources of eudaimonism to meet these lines of criticism. Chapter 2, 3, and 4 survey the views of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, to discover insights that are important for a successful response. In Chapters 5 and 6, I offer my own account, based on what I call empathic identification. This is the habit or disposition of seeing things, in effect, through the eyes of others. Empathic identification is a process through which the interpersonal transmission of reasons for actions between persons becomes possible. I argue first that our interest in our own eudaimonia justifies us in identifying empathically with others as a general habit or disposition. Second, I argue that empathic identification explains our intuitions about the respect others are due. So empathic identification generates the right sort of explanation of our intuitions about the constraints others and their interests impose upon us after all, and renders eudaimonist virtue ethics a viable form of ethical theory. (shrink)

This paper addresses a complaint, by Prichard, against Plato and other ancients. The charge is that they commit a mistake is in thinking that we are capable of giving reasons for the requirements of duty, rather than directly and immediately apprehending those requirements. I respond in two ways. First, Plato does not make the egregious mistake of substituting interest for duty, and thus giving the wrong kind of reason for duty’s requirements, as Prichard alleges. Second, we should see that the (...) ancient ethical enterprise as being comprehensive in a sense Prichard simply ignores. The ancients sought what we now call wide reflective equilibrium in judgments about both duty and interest, and to see this I focus on a puzzle in how to understand much of ancient moral philosophizing. This puzzle is to make sense of the work that formal constraints on happiness do to support their preferred views of happiness (or interest). This way of engaging not only our thoughts about duty and interest, but about what it is to be human and to lead a human life, make the ancient model far more satisfying than Prichard’s recommendation that we give it all up as a mistake. (shrink)

Philosophical reflection on ethical value may be motivated in a number of ways. One common origin can occur when we observe that we often do not agree with people around us in their ethical commitments, and begin to puzzle how to make sense of that fact. Most of us have some strong beliefs as to ways our world can be a morally better or worse place: we agree for instance that the world is a better place for having less slavery (...) in it than it used to. That is to say, we think slavery is a bad — a morally bad — thing. Similarly, most of us agree that the world is better off for our being in time to grab a small child out of the path of a speeding automobile than it would be if we came a moment too late. Saving a child from death or grave harm is a good — morally good — thing. The idea that the world includes ethical values like the goodness and badness of such things seems unproblematic when we focus on issue on which most of us agree. Yet our confidence that the world contains such values wobbles when we turn our attention to more controversial issues. (shrink)

Review of Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, edited by James Lenman and Yonatan Shemmer.

In this book Genevieve Lloyd undertakes an expansive and ambitious survey of the notion of providence and related concepts, effectively throughout the recorded history of Western civilization. In any work of a scope this ambitious, there are bound to be both omissions and problematic elements of interpretation; the only question is whether or not these are sufficient to undermine the positive philosophical work that the survey accomplishes. The answer in this case is a resounding ‘no.’ Lloyd’s book provides much to (...) chew on not only for moral philosophers, but for philosophers of religion, metaphysicians and others interested in free will and determinism, and many others for whom the concepts of providence, fate, necessity, free will, responsibility and other related ideas are of interest. (shrink)

The project of this paper is to address a complaint, by Prichard, against Plato and other ancients, as committing a basic “mistake” in moral philosophy. The basic mistake is in thinking that we are capable of giving reasons for the requirements of duty, rather than directly and immediately apprehending those requirements. Prichard’s argument that this is a mistake consists in an argument that attempts to give reasons for such requirements always fail. He classes those attempts into two kinds, and one (...) of those kinds is exemplified by Plato. (I leave aside here the second kind.) My response is to show two things. First, Plato does not make the egregious mistake of substituting interest for duty, and thus giving the wrong kind of reason for duty’s requirements, as Prichard alleges. This allegation assumes, first, that they duty and interest are entirely distinct notions, and, second, that we have a clear and accurate sense of the contents and bounds of each. Neither of these assumptions is accepted by Plato, and appreciating what their denial involves is essential to grasping the enterprise of moral philosophy as the ancients practiced it. Second, we should see that enterprise as being comprehensive in a sense Prichard simply ignores. They are seeking what we now call wide reflective equilibrium in judgments about both duty and interest, and to see this I focus on a puzzle in how to understand much of ancient moral philosophizing. This puzzle is how to make sense of the work the ancients see formal constraints on happiness as supporting their preferred views of happiness (or interest). I claim that they way they do so is a mess on any picture other than one of a search for wide reflective equilibrium, and this way of engaging not only our thoughts about duty and interest, but what it is to be human, and to lead a human life, make the ancient model far more satisfying than Prichard’s recommendation that we give it all up as a mistake. (shrink)